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LAW'S OWN ONTOLOGY 
A COMMENT ON LAW'S QUANDARY 
Joseph Vining+ 
This is the last sentence of Steven Smith's elegant book, Law's 
Quandary: "[I]n the meantime ... we would perhaps be wise to confess 
our confusion and to acknowledge that there are richer realities and 
greater powers in the universe than our meager modern philosophies 
I have dreamed of." 
Being taken to this in the end justifies a life of work in law, which 
today especially needs constant defense and justification. For some the 
highest reason and sufficient justification is working toward peace, 
simply peace among people and, now, peace between us and the sentient 
world beyond us and even the earth itself. Justice is its highest reward 
for others. But for many more than would admit it-I myself might say 
all-the deep reward, the justification, for working in law is in this last 
sentence, to be brought even against one's own resistance to the 
anteroom of what we now call "belief" and there, in the end, to a more 
confident sense of one's own substance and reality that everyone thirsts 
for in and out of law. The late poet Czeslaw Milosz, who struggled with 
his own beliefs throughout his life, liked to quote Pascal, that "to deny, to 
believe, and to doubt absolutely- this is for man what running is for a 
horse."2 Smith's book runs like a horse. 
It runs and takes us with it because there is such a voice in it, that 
brings us as readers closer to the subject of the search he undertakes, 
"performatively" as it were. Law, if it is law, is authoritative, and the 
authoritative is voice, voice heard. And the book takes us along so well 
through fields of denial, belief, and doubting because it has a clearly 
maintained structure that makes you want to read it through, in the way 
the very structure itself of a piece of music contributes to your continuing 
to listen. 
At the beginning Smith sets out commonly shared ontologies, 
languages, or terms used in describing what is real in the world around us 
or in the universe, to which we have been exposed in the twentieth 
century and which anyone growing up in the twenty-first century inherits, 
and to which we necessarily turn in discussing and solving our problems 
+ Hutchins Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Professor Vining's most recent 
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1. STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY 179 (2004). 
2. CZESLA W MILOSZ, If Only This Could Be Said, in TO BEGIN WHERE I AM 314, 
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in making sense of the world and deciding what to do individually or 
jointly. There are three, the ontologies of mundane, everyday 
experience, of science including mathematics, and of religion. He calls 
them, nicely, "ontological lumberyards." 
He then shows law, living, functioning, and inescapably there, but 
working in a way that cannot be understood or explained if its 
practitioners are in fact confining themselves to the first two of his 
ontological lumberyards, mundane everyday experience, and modern 
science. This brings him and us to the question of faith or belief in 
realities not found in either one. 
I should like to comment on both these strengths of the book, its voice 
and its structure, and then turn briefly to the special problem of the 
"constructive author" of the law to which the last part of the book is 
devoted. 
AUTHORITY 
First, voice, and the connection between voice, the phenomenon of 
authority, and the existence of law. The book's initial and continuing 
question, obviously felt but sometimes jauntily put as from a jester in the 
corner, is what is "the law" to which there is such constant reference and 
appeal? Is it something real, in and of itself? Does it exist, and if so how 
and in what way? All act as if it does, really does. But is there more than 
"as if" which is a pretense?-so that, to quote Smith on page 80, "the law 
is a sort of large-scale conspiracy to defraud the public and to preserve 
for the legal profession power that the public would not be willing to 
grant if it understood what is really going on"? 
A straightforward answer to this straightforward question is that "the 
law" exists, it is real, it has effects on us and the world, if and when it is 
heard and attended to in all the swirl of voices in our heads including 
what we initially think of as our own. We regularly say that something in 
the legal world has been reduced to a "dead letter." We regularly say 
something in the legal world has become "fictional." But I think we do 
not say there is nothing, ever, that raises the thought of willing obedience 
or good faith response. · 
So I might suggest that when what is spoken of as "the law" has 
authority, it exists in the human world, is really there, and when it has no 
authority and is either ignored with a "So what, catch me if you can," or 
evaded through imagination, cleverness, and application, it is dead and 
with us only as the dead are. The question of "the reality of the law" and 
whether the law actually has a name when someone purports to speak 
"in the name of the law" can alternatively be put as the question, "What 
is the reality of authority, the reality of willing obedience?" Smith's 
discussion is often explicit in this regard and bears emphasizing, to bring 
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out of the shadows what is implicit for purposes of further discussion the 
book will generate. There is for instance a phrase that is repeated in the 
book, "how the law actually works." If we ask what does "work" mean 
in "how the law actually works," the answer would not be a description 
of the details of the processes of legal proceedings and legal institutions, 
but the bringing about of good-faith joint effort. That is when law 
"works." 
The reality of authority is not force, which would blend into a scientific 
ontology. I or others who say "it is not force" do not need, I think, to 
prove that force is ultimately inadequate. The unfoldingness and 
unpredictability of human life is enough to counter the contrary, that 
"force alone is real." What allows not only any one of us but humanity 
itself to navigate the material world is creativity, individual, then joint, 
then individual again. Authority unleashes creativity and pursuit of a 
purpose that is not just an individual purpose and that takes more than 
an individual arm and more than any merely calculating mind to achieve. 
We can all be confident of this, certainly all of us in law, even though so 
many who are the flower of contemporary university training devote 
their lives to trying to prove that a merely calculating mind can reach all 
there is or can be. 
References to authority run through Law's Quandary. Authority 
makes an appearance on page 60, is taken up again in discussion of legal 
method on page 95 and again in the discussion of constructed authors on 
page 129, the phrase there being "authoritative guidance." It is 
inattention to the question of authority that makes what Smith calls 
"other paradigms" after the "classical" stumble as they have been 
advanced one by one during the twentieth century-legal "realism" (the 
opposite, we can note, of mathematical "realism," which is Platonic), or 
legal "positivism" sparked by a quasi-scientific and literalist view of 
language, or "law and policy" including economics, or "law and 
philosophy." On page 151, through his discussion of baseball and chess, 
Smith points out what those who have an impression of law really being 
rules (like the rules of games, or of arithmetic) do not immediately see, 
their own reliance on authority, and on the method used to reach it and 
the presuppositions of that method, as they go about working on law's 
"substantive content" and saying what they think the law says. The 
absence of authority is why, on pages 168-69, Smith finds Platonism as an 
ontological resource insufficient for law. Mathematical objects, however 
real and there to be discovered, do not command, especially not action or 
restraint of action. 
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The question of authority, and of resistance and evasion, shadows any 
discussion of law. Authority is surely also a problem.3 Understanding it 
and its place and how it enters is perhaps more difficult today than in the 
past, though any sense that this is the case may only be a reflection of the 
quandary Smith presents. But foregrounding it even as a problem helps 
open law's own ontological contributions to view. 
LA W'S ONTOLOGY 
My second comment is on the structure of the book. It is very simply 
that, in the book, law itself is not among the modern ontological 
lumberyards Smith describes at the beginning, the mundane, the 
scientific, and the religious. Those in law, practicing law or speaking for 
or about law, are presented in the book as looking out from law to what 
ontological supplies there are in the lumberyards available. The 
limitations or absences in the lumberyards marked ordinary life and 
modern science produce the "ontological gap" in which law finds itself-
a memorable and effective phrase-and bring us to the edge of the third 
"ontological family" those in law might look out to, the resources of 
religious thought, belief, imagination, and experience. 
This structure, which is a process of elimination, is a strength of the 
book and part of its persuasive power. It is very different from the form 
I adopted in a book of mine, that Smith actually describes on page 171, 
with some amusement, as a "self-consciously meandering method."4 But 
certainly if you do think of law as empty or derivative, or as a set of rules, 
a game, or, worse, as an opiate or a conspiracy, then presenting to you at 
the beginning the thought that the legal mind is something to be 
reckoned with on its own terms would be unwise. It would be a drag on 
any hope that you will stay with the argument to the end. As with any 
injured person to whose inner resources one wants to appeal, gentling 
you along is the effective course. 
Now such characterizations of legal thought, empty in itself, derivative, 
are heavily concentrated in academic writing, as Smith notes frequently. 
When Smith or others of us, myself included, use the pronoun "we" or 
"us" in discussing law and its problems we are always in danger of 
conflating academe with the wider world. There is a picture of the world 
and of ourselves taught by so many, implicitly and explicitly (and not 
only in the physical and social sciences), that it might be broadbrushed as 
"the academic picture." It is definite enough. The teaching, with 
3. See, e.g., AFrER AUTHORITY (Patrick McKinley Brennan ed., forthcoming). 
4. I defended it, in "A Note on Form" at the end, as presenting the legal form of 
thought in the only way experience so connected to action, and so connected to an 
individual's own identity in the world, would not be lost in the presentation. See JOSEPH 
VINING, FROM NEWTON'S SLEEP 357 (1995). 
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examinations of course on how well it can be reproduced, is that the 
world we live in is entirely a world of systems and processes, and that we 
ourselves are only expressions of the interaction between the systems 
within us and the systems around us. "Complex adaptive systems" we 
are sometimes called, or "emergent properties" of systems, who are to be 
seen in turn as parts of higher order systems. Though the scientific 
community, in which this picture takes its strongest and most explicit 
form, does not like seeing itself and the cumulative insights of scientific 
investigation in these terms, the picture, that "this is all there is," we find 
all around us in academic life presented as the objective truth that 
ultimately all will come to embrace. 
But law is not academic. The university is not its home. Law is in the 
wider world and is pervasive there, in language, thought, and action. 
Every order given in a corporation, and every defense or challenge to it, 
every exercise of authority based on the law of property, and every 
defense or challenge to it, every encounter with an administrative 
agency, takes what we might think of as mundane or ordinary talk, 
decision, and action into the world of law, into law's language, and into 
the legal form of thought. Everyone is imbued with it. 
Noting the danger of conflating academe with the wider world is not to 
deny the wisdom of the structure Smith chose for the book. But if you 
begin to contemplate law as itself an ontological resource, in addition to 
the mundane, the scientific or mathematical, and the religious, the 
consequence of the book's structure becomes clear-our looking at the 
end, by a process of elimination, only to the ontology of religious life. 
Of course in pointing to law's home in the wider world and to how 
much a turn to law and the legal form of thought is part of ordinary life, I 
raise the possibility that instead of being left at the edge of religious life 
looking forward, we might look back. The legal form of thought might 
be merged into ordinary life in our understanding of it, and the ontology 
of it put in the family dynasty Smith designates as the mundane. But vast 
numbers are also imbued with thought and perception we call religious. 
When we speak of the religious we are not looking to the mentality of a 
limited professional group. We are talking of the ordinary. But we do 
not for that reason collapse the religious into the mundane. Instead we 
tend to see, with Cardinal Newman, the extraordinariness of the 
ordinary. In something of the same way the ontology of law goes beyond 
that of ordinary life, and I think that is Smith's view here also. 
So let us look forward to the resources or "lumberyard" of religious 
life, then to the remaining of Smith's alternatives, the scientific, and then 
to what can be said for looking to law itself. 
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LAW AND THE COMMITMENTS OF RELIGION 
Smith begins with an overarching sense of law, "classical" or 
"traditional," preceding the developments of the twentieth century. One 
view, which he outlines, is that this overarching sense depended upon 
and linked human law to divine law with divine judgment and sanction.5 
This is a conclusion about the past, especially the just-pre-twentieth 
century past, that I myself have to be wrestled toward. I recognize that I 
may mix current perception, including my own, with what predecessors 
actually thought a century ago, and that establishing and understanding 
the substance of their thought is something intellectual historians trained 
as such offer to do for us. But intellectual history is not the same as 
lawyers looking back, if only because of the disengagement from idea or 
belief intellectual history displays and perhaps·must display. 
Rather than depending on and linking to divine law and judgment, the 
"classical account," which reappears at the end of Law's Quandary as the 
"neoclassical," may present human law as having affinities with or 
sisterly resemblances to the practices, language, and self-reflections of 
religious life. They can remain affinities or sisterly resemblances 
however religious one's sense of the origins of the capacities that permit 
us to do what we do, work the way we do. "The law" and the persons 
that populate the world of law may be this side of the Divine though 
irreducible to individual human beings. The caring mind that is 
presupposed and sought in seeking to know or speak for law need not be, 
indeed cannot be a mind that comprehends the universe. The value of 
the individual in law-or the push for it, or the presumption of it-does 
lose force without a warrant that transcends anything human, to which 
the twentieth century is a witness. But in general and as an 
"overarching" matter, I have sought and I wonder whether Smith and 
others do not also seek an understanding of what an inclusive "we" do 
and think in law that someone without or before an ultimate 
commitment to the Divine could open herself or himself to. 
Such a commitment is I think a very individual matter, quite apart 
from the size of the gap there may be, before such a commitment, 
between one's actual faith and what one says or says to oneself one 
5. Smith describes this view as seeing in the pre-twentieth century understanding a 
"theistically oriented metaphysics positing God as a sort of transcendent Legislator and 
the hidden source even of human law." As examples he refers to Fortesque in the 
fifteenth century ("'all laws that are promulgated by man are decreed by God"') and 
Blackstone in the eighteenth ('"This law of nature, ... being ... dictated by God himself, 
... such (human laws] as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately 
or immediately, from this original."'). SMITH, supra note 1, at 47 (quoting SIR JOHN 
FORTESCUE, ON THE LAWS AND GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND 7 (Shelley Lockwood ed., 
1997) (1471), and WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *41). 
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believes. Working with and in law, dealing constantly with suffering, 
purpose, authority, and authenticity, may open one to faith that is larger 
and deeper than the faith practiced in law. Working naturally with the 
personal beyond and behind any individual or individual life may make it 
only natural to look beyond that too. But, again, it is the individual that 
looks and says "Yes," and this is not a matter of perception only but of 
orientation of life and acceptance of demands over and above those of 
law. 
There is, too, a question underlying my own sense that in the anteroom 
of religious life to which Smith brings us there is ontological lumber of 
law's own-a question whether translation of it into religious terms can 
sit well with faith in our freedom and acceptance of our own 
responsibility for what we do and fail to do. The longer the perspective, 
what we fail to do seems the more important; and the very contemplation 
in law of "inaction," "omission," "negligence," and "criminal negligence" 
is connected to the real possibility of initiative instead of mere response, 
connected to purpose that may be in law's own lumberyard and to living 
value (though now "lumber" has the disadvantage of its deadness, to be 
put beside its evocatory advantage in pointing to what we construct and 
create). And what we do not fail to do, what we do manage, is connected 
to the question of authority shadowing all work in law, authority there in 
its degrees making possible joint initiative and joint purpose, and 
connected thus to the responsibility we ourselves bear as individuals 
when we undertake to speak and act in a position of authority. 
Even the fundamental values that animate initiative and by which 
responsibility is measured, that are real in some sense in ordinary life and 
real in some sense in law (and not real at all in "scientific" ontology), do 
not seem to me best seen as drawing their reality directly from what is 
beyond the anteroom of religious faith. I think it is fair to say, just as a 
matter of observation, that they have something like life themselves. Not 
only ordinary talk but the considered language of law and lawyers speaks 
of "respect" for a value, "regard" for a value, no-respect and disregard-
language used when an individual or an animal is concerned, a living 
sentient being. "Life," "living," "to be alive," does more than arguably 
have for us an element of the transcendental. Nonetheless it is our work 
that keeps living value alive, in the same way that it is our work that 
keeps a person we hear and perceive real for us and alive to us. 
LAW AND ONTOLOGICAL STATEMENTS IN SCIENCE 
When we turn to the remaining ontological family in Law's Quandary, 
the scientific and mathematical, we see how overt the ontological is all 
around us in contemporary scientific and mathematical description and 
discussion and how justified Smith is in taking the bold step of speaking 
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openly here about "reality." Ontological claims are signaled generally by 
the verbs "is" and "exists" and of course by the adverb "really." They 
may be negative or positive. For instance, a prominent philosopher of 
science writing recently on "mathematical infinity" for general readers6 
speaks of "serious doubts about whether it really exists," of his 
personally not accepting that mathematical procedures "give rise to 
actual infinities," and of the paradoxes that "seem[] to follow once such 
completed infinities were thought of as real." He goes on to ask, "[H]ow 
can we seriously suppose that infinite sets really exist?" Or a prominent 
physicist, pleading recently to the general reader for greater 
understanding and acceptance of "indirect scientific evidence," presents 
"field theory" as "the theory I use that . . . describes objects existing 
throughout space that create and destroy particles." She speaks of 
"observing" as "involving a train of theoretical logic by which we can 
interpret what is 'seen"' and, with regard to space and the dimensions of 
space, "establish the existence of extra dimensions." In the end she turns 
to a form of majority rule, "the bulk of the scientific community" 
determining the "true story," but that her own positive claims are 
"ontological" in character is evident.7 "Do I believe in extra 
dimensions?" she writes elsewhere. "I confess I do .... Sometimes ... an 
idea seems like it must contain a germ of truth .... I suddenly realized 
that I really believed that some form of extra dimensions must exist. "8 
Against this background of overt ontology we can slip into law's with 
an example that I think cuts across the scientific, the legal, and the 
religious. A New York Times op-ed comment9 on the recent 
documentary on the Antarctic emperor penguin, March of the Penguins, 
argued with approval that we have become more comfortable calling 
what we see there "love." The comment was of the kind that proposes 
easing or eliminating the line between human beings and animals by 
pulling us across it toward them, rather than them across it toward us. 
"I've long known the story of the emperor penguins," the commentator 
says, "having told it to generations of biology students as a textbook 
example of adaptation . . . . In a broad physiological sense, we are 
practically identical not only with other mammals but also with birds ... 
except for differences in detail of particular design specifications." 
Then comes the ontological statement of interest. "Functionally," he 
says, "I suspect love is an often temporary chemical imbalance of the 
6. David Papineau, Room for One More, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Nov. 16, 2003, at 
54 (reviewing DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, EVERYTHING AND MORE: A COMPACT 
HISTORY OF 00 (2005)). 
7. See Lisa Randall, Op-Ed, Dangling Particles, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2005, at 13. 
8. LISA RANDALL, WARPED PASSAGES 3 (2005). 
9. Bernd Heinrich, Op-Ed, Talk to the Animals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2005, at Al9. 
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brain induced by sensory stimuli that causes us to maintain focus on 
something that carries an adaptive agenda." The ontological claim is 
made by the "is" in "love is .... " It is modified slightly by his term 
"functionally," but the point of his commentary is to urge us, the "us" 
that appears in his definition of love, not to be shy about using the word 
"love" for what moves the penguin-what moves the penguin need be no 
different from what moves us, an often temporary chemical imbalance of 
the brain that is adaptive. 
This is a textbook example of ontology that wishes to be thought 
scientific, chosen for wide publication. To reflect here for a moment on 
how law might approach this statement and claim may bring out aspects 
of what I would want to call law's own ontology. 
What would the legal mind do with a statement like this, in thinking 
about coming to some conclusion about love? In law we are all 
witnesses, as I think we also are very much in personal life. When 
presented in law with this sentence about love, there would be interest in 
what this same individual said at home, what he meant when heard to say 
"I love you" to his wife, child, friend, or sister. Putting the two 
statements together, the one made at home and the one made 
professionally, as would be done in cross-examination on a witness stand, 
a lawyer or jury would conclude either that the word "love" in the one 
statement, made in class when teaching the penguin's love as a textbook 
example of a system operating in an adaptive way, means something 
different from "love" in the other statement at home; or, if the two words 
are meant to convey the same, that he doesn't believe what he is saying 
in class, in which case it would not affect thinking about love, any more 
than any witness's statement shown on cross-examination to be one in 
which he does not believe is taken seriously.10 
Law does not have a special sense of love, though if law did, it would 
be expressed in John Noonan's very beautiful response to Richard 
Posner's view of moral and political theory. 11 But law does not stop with 
a scientific sense of love, if this teaching is in any way an example of it. 
Law could not stop with the scientific, not because law is intrinsically 
ordinary on the one hand or religious on the other, but because of law's 
own various underlying commitments that can be fairly called 
ontological: commitment to looking to all the evidence in a way neither 
10. As for the thought he might consistently conceive of love and himself this latter 
way, law would hear him speaking in asking for trust and authority as a teacher, and 
speaking also in what he does, in his gestures and in his self-restraint toward those he says 
he loves. 
11. John T. Noonan, Jr., Posner's Problematics, 111 HARV. L. REV.1768, 1775 (1998); 
see also MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER (1991) (drawing its title from Noonan's 
work); cf VINING, supra note 4, at 264-65. 
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the mundane nor the scientific does; commitment to the presence of 
persons whose statements and actions may be spread over time both 
within and beyond an individual span of life; commitment to the 
possibility of authenticity in those statements; commitment to the sense 
of language Smith notes, that linguistic meaning is the meaning of a 
person, always, whatever we pretend-is always metaphorical if you will; 
and finally, commitment to a first fact, basic, on which other conclusions 
are built, the fact we are more than one, and, when one of us speaks, 
about anything, he or she is only one. 
It is true that many call love the something more in the very structure 
of the universe than form (that merely is). I have mentioned John 
Noonan in law. This something more-call it love-makes possible a 
human mind that cares. It is necessary to human authority and 
authenticity toward which lawyers work, as necessary to lawyers' work as 
oxygen. Since it has no place in the ontological family of science and 
mathematics (as oxygen has), its reality for law, lawyers, and legal 
thought may be drawn from the "resources" of the other ontological 
family that is not mundane, linking law directly in the most basic way to 
what is beyond both law and science. If the "individual" and "life," 
which we noted before, can be thought to pass back and forth through 
the windows of the anteroom where lawyers work, love may pass through 
the walls themselves. Such a basic linkage may indeed be what Smith has 
in mind to suggest in discussing the "classical account" at the beginning 
of the book, and in his ending. 
But to return to the structure of the book and its three "ontological 
lumberyards,'' law can still be viewed as having a lumberyard 
distinctively legal. All that is necessary to law is not in law's own 
lumberyard. All that is necessary to science is not in science's own. 
Perhaps what is most necessary to scientific work, individual freedom, 
even creativity and trust, would be hard to find "existing" there. But 
science remains distinct, as can law. The human individual remains 
distinct, one's reality one's own, even though one's own resources of 
mind and spirit are manifestly inadequate. 
THE "ONTOLOGICAL INVENTORY" OF LAW 
Pulling ontological claims generally into the open, as Smith does, will I 
think bring the "ontological inventory" of law into the open over time. 
Authority is there, as a reality. Purpose is there, and inquiry into 
purpose, significant against the background of current presentations of 
scientific method in ontological terms-Jacques Monad's is the classic 
statement of this kind, that postulates of purpose anywhere in nature, 
which would include us, "exist at odds with objective knowledge, face 
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away from truth, and are strangers and fundamentally hostile to 
science. " 12 
The legal mind has its own sense of time, very much associated with 
supra-individual persons in law, and with the connection of any 
conclusion in law to action, which follows acknowledgement of authority. 
Time is the realest thing in the world, we may be inclined to think and 
continue to think despite hearing some in physics happily making the 
ontological statement that it can be shown to be only an illusion. 13 But 
the definition or sense of this "it" in one context-ordinary individual life 
or the astronomical or the religious or the musical - may not serve at all 
well in another, even though carried from context to context is the 
experience of reaching to express the same thing, "time." Law is one of 
these contexts in and of itself. 
As an example, the mundane and apparently clear line between past 
and future is does not hold in law. No present day Supreme Court that 
says in a perfectly natural way "in 1895 we rejected this argument" is 
living in time as experienced by individuals-the Court of Justices long 
dead is still "this Court." No endeavor is confined to the clock that has 
such difficulty, seen especially in administrative and constitutional law, in 
distinguishing past and future, past or "judicial" facts and future or 
"legislative" facts, the ex post facto and the prospective. What must be 
set aside as subject only to reflection or savoring with delight or regret 
(the "past," which is in repose) is not determined in law by the "passing" 
of time, scientific or ordinary. What is or is not put behind is a matter of 
some choice in law; and whether decisions and events can be remedially 
cancelled, or replayed, so that they are really as if they never were, and 
do not control individual expectations, is not argued or determined by 
invoking usual categories of time past, present, and future. Past, present, 
and future are terms that in law mostly express conclusions about where 
and how far to direct the force of law- that peculiar force in the world 
beyond the weak and the strong. 
Perhaps most irreplaceably, the individual lives in law's ontological 
inventory, the human individual and, to an increasing degree, the 
individual animal. Law's commitment to the fact that we are more than 
one is fundamental, not to be shut out of thought methodologically or 
ontologically, and I will refer here to James Boyd White's work.14 This 
12. JACQUES MONOD, CHANCE AND NECESSITY 171 (Austryn Wainhouse trans., 
Vintage Books ed. 1972) (1971). 
13. E.g., Dennis Overbye, String Theory, at 20, Explains It All (or Not), N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 7, 2004, at Fl (discussing the view of Dr. Edward Witten, Institute for Advanced 
Study, Princeton University). 
14. E.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, LIVING SPEECH: RESISTING THE EMPIRE OF FORCE 
(forthcoming 2006). 
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can be said noting, all the while, that violent imposition of pure will 
occurs through legal processes, and that power is exercised in the name 
of the law by those who can secure for the moment some extension of 
their individual strength. Oppression, deadening, blind grinding up of 
lives, success of efforts to use and manipulate through the processes of 
law, all can be admitted-they can hardly be denied. But these are what 
"the law,'' ontologically speaking, sets its face against. 15 So often these 
are just what legal argument is about. Law contains the terms of its own 
most powerful and effective criticism, which look to, maintain, and 
perhaps it could be said almost give us the individual, together with the 
person, and purpose, and living value. Disposing of the disputes of the 
day and bringing closure to them before a new day begins disappoints the 
hopes of individuals, to be sure, and that closure is done with force if 
necessary. But even if closure is forced, attention to and concern for the 
disappointed individual can still mark the decision and fuel imagining 
new ways to respond in the future. The strength of the individual in legal 
thought is not unlike the strength of natural selection in biological 
thought, or of force in physics. 
We can go so far as "reason" itself, on which Smith has written 
eloquently here and elsewhere.16 Reasoning or the rational has for most 
an ontological aspe~t. Its presence is often thought to differentiate the 
human from the animal. Rationality might be viewed as everywhere and 
essentially just consciously staying open to the evidence and fitting 
means to ends. But reasoning "scientific" or "logical" often involves 
capturing a perception or phenomenon, "time" for instance, or "love,'' or 
"life,'' so that it can be boxed and manipulated, and then unitizing it so 
that it can be put with other "like" phenomena in a class or group that 
can also be manipulated. Any kind of probability or statistics involves 
both these, capture and unitizing. They seem to be necessary whenever 
seeing something as a system or part of a system, which may in turn be 
necessary for manipulation. 
Legal thought eventually departs from this. Capturing eliminates the 
continuous unfoldingness of things and the reality of the necessity of 
assent to characterizations of perception, unitizing eliminates the reality 
of individuality-both realities, again, being part of the "ontological 
inventory" of law. The signal of a move from the rational and reasoning 
in law to the rational and reasoning as it proceeds in other fields often is 
substitution of an abstract symbol for a word, phrase, or sentence of 
human language. This is not to say that capturing and unitizing are not 
15. See Joseph Vining, The Cosmological Question: A Response lo Milner S. Ball's All 
the Company of Heaven, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2024 (1996). 
16. E.g., Steven D. Smith, Recovering (From) Enlightenment?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1263, 1282-1306 (2004). 
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useful in human affairs. But it may be to say that the usefulness in 
human affairs of such reasoning extends only to the point where the 
force of law, that proceeds from human imagination and creativity, is 
brought to bear on a situation and the future emerging from it. We can 
note that philosophy has some of law's rationality, since the practice of 
philosophy is often discussion of similar questions in something of the 
same way but using a different set of central texts. But there is to be seen 
in philosophy far more a floating logic, unmoored to the assent of 
individuals or the expression of a person in whom individuals are joined, 
and, to go with it, a floating meaning for propositions, unconnected to 
any person, that flirts with literalness in language; and this may be 
because focal texts organizing discussion have been generated without 
any intrinsic connection to outcomes in the world or responsibility for 
outcomes. 
FILLING THE "ONTOLOGICAL GAP" 
As Smith proceeds in his discussion, I think he cannot help at least 
starting to fill the "ontological gap" in which law lives with items from 
law's own ontological inventory, point by point, item by item. But there 
is a prior matter to be addressed in connection with what he calls 
"reigning" ontological orthodoxies. That is a claim made for some of 
them to totality, a quality recalling the totalitarian cosmologies in 
twentieth century social and political thought-the absence of the 
individual in them being the most evident connection. Smith is very 
much addressing this also in the structure of Law's Quandary. The 
process of elimination in the book does away with their "dynastic" 
aspect, to use his nice word, not the ontological families themselves. One 
can still hear the Big Bang, love one's primate cousins as cousins, and fly 
in airplanes with confidence after Smith is through. 
Totality is the first claim to be addressed for purposes just of 
understanding, which I think is Smith's first object and is reflected in his 
title word "Quandary." Just understanding, to help with a state of 
confusion, perplexity, oddness-pressing more and more, he notes, as 
early twentieth-century confidence faded that law's difference would 
fade. To go perhaps one step beyond, the twentieth century that we can 
now look back on was a century in which, far from merely persisting, the 
legal mind demonstrated new strength, protecting against the seduction 
of totalities of all kinds that emerged and were tried, and then, finally, 
protecting against the individual isolation and radical ignorance 
celebrated in the short-lived academic orthodoxy of postmodernism at 
the century's end. 
Understanding, however, is only the first of Smith's purposes. The 
situation he is offering to sort out and help with is not psychological only, 
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most certainly not academic only. In fact, within the family or dynasty 
Smith calls "scientific" there is competition for a total occupation of the 
human mind, "realist" mathematicians competing with some schools of 
biologists and some schools of physicists; some schools of physicists 
competing with some schools of biologists; all of them set against 
historicists in the social sciences-history of science, cultural history, 
sociology and anthropology. A lawyer might leave them to work it out 
over time and move themselves away from each wanting all, to the point 
where they acknowledge other ontological worlds than their own, had 
the twentieth century not shown the stakes to be so high in human life 
and suffering if any one of these total claims should come to occupy the 
field, which is the human mind. Where Smith leaves us is a safer place 
than we were before. 
THE NATURALNESS OF THE CONSTRUCTED AUTHOR 
Let me move finally from the question whether law has an "ontological 
family" of its own to the question that occupies almost a third of the 
book, the question of the "constructed author." My comment here is 
that the phrase "constructed author" should not be taken to suggest 
artificiality as opposed to, shall we say, "naturalness." Judges listening 
for the voice of the law, for which or whom they will speak, do what we 
all do when we listen to an individual speak over time and sort out what 
to take seriously and what not, how to read words as used, and what to 
treat as a mistake or as spoken when the individual is "not himself. "17 
That "himself" is a perception of our own, built up over time. Being our 
own, and ourselves having done the work of sorting to build it up, it is 
something of a creation of our own. But we would not do the work 
without faith or belief in the fact that there is a person to be heard that 
we are trying to hear. I think again and again how well· Wordsworth 
presented "all the mighty world [o]f eye and ear,'' with which he 
unabashedly said he was in love: "[o]f eye and ear,'' he said, "both what 
they half-create, [a)nd what perceive."18 We do half-create, but only half-
create-what we see and hear and love is real. We sort and choose and 
decide, within the structure of a sentence, within the confines of a text, in 
17. How do you read Smith, for example, in the last sentence of Part II of the book, 
on page 96: "Thus far, it seems, the suspicion of low-talk as nonsense stands unrebutted"? 
And I can hope readers' eyes blur as a quotation from me passes before them, '"(W]hat 
are it and our own but points to a larger mind(?]"' with missing letters sliding in so that 
"points" becomes "pointers." SMITH, supra note 1, at 173 (quoting VINING, supra note 4, 
at 220). 
18. WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, Lines Written a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey, in 
WILLIAM WORDSWORTH: THE MAJOR WORKS 131, 134 (Stephen Gill ed., rev. ed. 2000). 
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a conversation extending over a lifetime. We do this too in the universe 
of texts we admit into "legislation" or "precedent." 
Moreover, the very meaning of the words being read is constructed at 
the same time the author is constructed, both of them in tandem, and 
there is surely no one to say what the necessary meaning of a word is, no 
one anywhere with authority of that kind: the meaning given and taken 
may be almost new. The difference between the experience of listening 
to a person to whom we give an individual name, and the equally natural 
experience of listening to the persons that populate law and are not 
enfleshed, does not lie in what is heard in the mind. The persons in law 
to whom we give names like "The Court" or "Congress" or "The 
Commission" speak through us when we speak for them, and the 
moment any of us speaks for such a person, the statement is taken up by 
others to be sorted, interpreted, discarded, and otherwise decided about 
in a way that is not very different from what others do with what we say 
on our own behalf. How far we can go toward the existence of such 
persons equivalent to the existence of individual persons I do not know. 19 
But we cannot ignore how far we do go, how virtually all in law actually 
act and speak today, and it is one of the achievements of Law's 
Quandary to make us look at it. 
There are special difficulties and differences when we move to multi-
authored legal texts, or texts that are reauthored when put to a vote 
insofar as the understanding of the voter is thought to be a source of the 
text's meaning. (I say "insofar" because in perhaps all cases of voting the 
body within which votes are cast, and in whose name these words and 
sentences are uttered, is itself read as speaking not for itself but for 
another.) Smith surveys the difficulties without resolution. The marks 
on paper that we call legislation are read, and not as products of the 
forces that made them in the legislative machinery. They are read in the 
closest way. The mere fact of such close reading can be taken as 
evidence of belief we are not ready to admit, or, as I have suggested 
elsewhere,20 it may be a necessary and even desirable playing of a trick 
upon ourselves, tearing arbitrary holes in what would otherwise be too 
confining a structure constantly being built up. A generation ago Grant 
Gilmore and Guido Calabresi after him21 proposed that as a matter of 
empirical observation, lawyers and courts approach the extensive 
19. A helpful exploration can be found in w. M. GELDART, LEGAL PERSONALITY 
(1924). 
20. See JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN 110-41 
(1986); Joseph Vining, Generalization in Interpretive Theory, REPRESENTATIONS, Spring 
1990, at 1, reprinted in LAW AND THE ORDER OF CULTURE 1 (Robert Post ed., 1991). 
21. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); 
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95-98 (1977). 
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modern landscape of legislative materials rather as they approach 
common law materials. It does seem that in any particular instance of 
legislation it is possible for a spirit to grip a fractured group and lead 
them toward a joint expression. We see such a spirit constantly searched 
for in holding corporate bodies genuinely responsible for disregard of 
values expressed and protected in law, the Andersen22 case being only the 
most recent. 
We go back to the actual ontology of law and to the question of 
entertaining the reality of inspiration, knitting things together over time 
in ways we are surprised by and happy to accept. "Inspiration," that 
Smith takes up in his discussion of Socrates at the very end, is one of the 
great questions and a live issue in arguments about the status of jointly 
authored texts and texts reauthored through voting on them. 
"Inspiration" may be there in the inventory of legal ontology. Certainly 
it has no place in systems of thought that deny or have no place for spirit. 
Inspiration, spirit, and, I think, the truly creative are bound together. All 
are there, or none are there, and as Smith helps us see, none are there in 
those forms of thought that are so widely imagined to be the ultimate end 
of thinking itself. 
Law's Quandary is in part life's quandary. We hardly know what we 
ourselves think, individually, in advance of trying to speak or write. We 
discover it. We should not be surprised that we hardly know what we 
think about the nature of law, so necessary to ordinary life, necessary 
even to science. We discover that too, and we work on it, and most 
significantly, none of us has much time to do it. We enter into law, and 
we leave as others are taking it up. But occasionally we can jump ahead 
of our own work and discovery, reading a book as a revelation-those 
are books we keep in a special place, and everyone has his or her own 
collection. Steven Smith's book will be entering many of those 
collections. And then too, always in the background of speaking about 
law is hearing and speaking for law, which we are also doing, and the one 
does blend with the other. The very capacity to read this book together, 
with varying responses we put to one another, is a demonstration of that 
basic ontological faith, law's faith, that beyond the individual speaking 
who is only one speaking, there is a "we," in reality, with whom we 
individually are identified during our time in the most wonderful way, 
never starting from scratch, and whom we wish well in the undertaking to 
understand and protect that will go on beyond our time. 
22. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005). 
